Army harvests more victories as Kilinochchi goal nears

Army harvests more victories as Kilinochchi goal nears

Top LTTE wounded leader allegedly in safe house in Tamil Nadu after treatment, raises the question: Will Prabhakaran escape the same way?
Reliable information from Tamil Nadu says that a high-profile LTTE leader has been admitted to a Tamil Nadu hospital to obtain treatment to his injuries. This particular Tiger leader has received protection from Tamil Nadu politicians and their supporters. After he was treated at the hospital, he has reportedly received an Indian identity with a change of name to Sundaralingam Saumyaraj. After treatment he has been whisked away to a safe-house in the state of Tamil Nadu.
Will Prabakaran escape the same way?Meanwhile, The Times of India reported last week that there were six boats abandoned along the Rameshwaram-Nagapattinam coasts. (Indian coastal guard officers do not mention exact figures because they are sympathisers of LTTE as well, and receive bribes from the LTTE.) But information reaching from Tamil Nadu says that not six, but more than 20 such boats have landed on those coastal areas. Some of these boats have been repainted and sold to Indian fishermen while some had their engines missing.
Navy Commander Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda said during the interview on the Thulawa programme aired over state-owned Independent Television Network (ITN) a few days ago, that he has implemented an effective naval blockade so that the LTTE could neither flee nor smuggle in arms into the island. If he has implemented such a naval blockade, then how come these LTTE cadres who were in Pooneryn are now in Tamil Nadu?
There are several small islands like Mandativu, Delft etc between the coasts of Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu. What has happened to the Sri Lanka Navy’s Rapid Boat and Special Boat Squadrons, which have more than 100 boats in their possession? What happened to the Navy Radar system? Vice admiral Karannagoda said in the same Thulawa interview, that the troops were effectively advancing into enemy-held territory because the Navy had destroyed a few LTTE arms ships sometime back.
After the brave Officers and sailors had destroyed the LTTE arms ships in the deep seas, Vice Admiral Karannagoda, addressing the media at the Media Centre for National Security said that the LTTE had stocks of artillery and mortar rounds for only about another three months. But strangely, more than a year has gone by and the LTTE is still launching devastating artillery and mortar rounds at the soldiers.
Advance
The steady advance of the troops into LTTE-held areas is mainly due to three factors:
1. Good leadership
2. Bravery of soldiers 
3. Commitment, dedication and high morale.
4. Effective military tactics and strategy 
These are the reasons that keep the soldiers moving ahead against severe odds. A senior officer said that 60% of casualties in the Army were due to LTTE artillery and mortar fire. If what the Navy Commander said about the LTTE’s three months supply of artillery and mortar is correct, certain moot questions need to be answered ; Why are soldiers still getting killed or wounded by artillery and mortar rounds? Whenever the Tigers launch their boats from the Mullaitivu coasts, the Navy needs assistance from the Sri Lanka Air Force to destroy them. If the Naval blockade is effective, how do these Tiger boats reach the Tamil Nadu coasts? If they can proceed from Sri Lanka to the Indian coast without being detected by the Navy, will not the reverse also hold true? Cannot the LTTE boats can smuggle in weapons the same way?
The Sri Lanka Army is successful today because they dominate the land. Likewise, the Navy should dominate the seas if the on-going operation is to be more successful. As long as it is on the defensive, the LTTE smuggling routes will be open. The smuggling is done by deep sea trawlers, with the loads being transferred to smaller fishing craft. Most of these fishing craft have special compartments defying easy detection, to carry concealed weapons. If this smuggling could be restricted, there are better chances of our soldiers surviving artillery or mortar attacks.
Battle in Jaffna Although the current weather conditions are adverse, with rain and floods in Mullaitivu, Kilinochchi and Jaffna, the military pressure against the liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in these areas too are equally high. In the Jaffna peninsula, the security Forces Commander Major General G.A. Chandrasiri is equally busy winning the hearts and minds of the public.
At the same time, the Sri Lanka Army’s 55 Division Commander Brigadier Prasanna Silva and 53 Division Commander Brigadier Kamal Gunaratne are implementing tactical battle plans under the instructions of Army Commander Lieutenant General Sarath Fonseka. For the last couple of weeks the 53 and the 55 Divisions have been dominating the Nagarkovil, Muhamalai and Kilali areas, while the LTTE has been directing artillery fire on them. The Army too has been retaliating with artillery and multi barrel rockets at the Tigers.
Capture of Kilali area The most significant success in this battle has been the ability of the 5th Vijayabahu Infantry Regiment (VIR) to take control of the high grounds in the Kilali area. This particular area has been the region where the Army has lost the most number of men and material due to the Tigers making use of the high ground as an observation post and targeting the advancing forces. Last year (2007), whenever the Army advanced on to Kilali, the Tigers were able to observe the troop movements from these high grounds and mount precise attacks on them. But this time round, the brave soldiers of 5th VIR were able to overcome the LTTE resistance and capture this area by demolishing the LTTE bunkers. Currently the Army’s Engineering Unit is removing the sophisticated laid out booby traps and mines set by the LTTE to defend this high ground, as it is tactically vital for them. A senior Army officer said, “We have now taken over this LTTE defence line and we are going to take over the next very soon and march on to Elephant Pass.”
Mechanised Infantry UnitAnother unique factor is, in this battle, the Army’s newly formed Mechanised Infantry Unit – the brainchild of Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka himself, has played a crucial role. Specially designed or modified tanks moved along with the troops and successfully destroyed the LTTE bunkers, clearing the way for ground troops to move forward swiftly. Simultaneously, 130 and 150mm artillery (with a range of 27 kms or more) together with Multi Barrel Rocket Launchers (MBRL) have been in action providing further support to the troops.
Battle in KilinochchiMeanwhile, troops from the Jaffna area are consolidating their positions and are engaging expert snipers to target specific Tiger area leaders. According to reports from security sources in the Kilinochchi theatre of operations, the 57 Division is consolidating its position in the Adampan area. Though the Tigers mounted a severe counter attack on December 6 at around 2.00 am under cover of the heavy down pour, the soldiers who had been expecting such attacks were able to repulse the attack with MBRLs and artillery, while ground troops engaged the attacking Tigers. Troops observing through their night vision glasses confirmed that the Tigers had picked up their dead and wounded while fleeing.
Meanwhile confrontations were reported from the north and west of Adampan, where the Army’s 57 Division of the 574 Brigade scored tremendous successes by defeating the LTTE in the vicinity of Iranamadu Tank area and south of Therumurikandy. Troops are consolidating their positions south of Iranamadu while Task Force 3, under the command of Brigadier Sathyapriya Liyanage is advancing on to Mullaitivu from east of Olumadu area along the A 34 road. On December 5, the Task force 3 had observed LTTE movements and had confronted the Tigers from around 10.00 am to 4.15 pm. They were backed by heavy artillery and were able to recover 11 bodies of Tiger cadres. Three of these were severely mutilated. They had also observed another five bodies being carried away by the fleeing Tiger cadres.
Operation Jayasikurui Operation Jayasikurui or Victory Certain, launched on May 13, 1997 at Puliyankulam and Kanagarayankulam saw many troops being killed and armaments destroyed. The Sri Lanka Army could not advance beyond these points. The 53rd Division spearheaded the offensive along with the 54th, 55th, 56th and 21st Divisions. It was preceded by a massive artillery and aerial bombardment with the Army breaking out of their fortifications at Vavuniya and Manal Aru and pushing into the LTTE-controlled Wanni. The objective of the operation was to capture the A9 highway, from Vavuniya to the Jaffna peninsula, thereby allowing the establishment of a main supply route (MSR) to the Army’s isolated Jaffna garrison. It was also meant to engage and draw the LTTE out of its secure jungle bases so that the Tigers could be crippled, if not destroyed, by the Army’s superior firepower.
The operation was very ambitious from the start, thus requiring large amounts of troops for both offensive operations and for the defense of captured territory. As a result units of the Sri Lanka Navy and the Sri Lanka Air Force too were deployed for ground operations in support of the Army. However, the operation didn’t manage to accomplish even half of its objectives. Exactly a year later, by mid-May 1998, the operation completely stalled. The critical A9 (between Mankulam and Kilinochchi) highway remained firmly in LTTE hands. It was planned that the highway would fall swiftly, but it didn’t. Yet the battle for the A9 was bloody, the LTTE admitted to losing some 1,300 fighters in the defence of the road.
At the beginning of the operation the Tigers used, for the first time in the war, artillery captured from the Army earlier during the battle of Mullaitivu. They hit the advancing military columns and put up stiff resistance. When the Army captured the three initial objectives of Mankulam, Omanthai and Nedunkerni towns, the operation was already behind schedule. As the two columns from Omanthai and Nedunkerni moved towards Puliyankulam in a pincer movement, the LTTE launched its first major counter-attack. LTTE commandos penetrated deep behind Army lines to smash a major staging area, destroying vast quantities of supplies and killing dozens of troops. Puliyankulam was meant to be the link-up point for the twin prongs of the Army assault. However, the LTTE had built very effective defenses at the village and after three months of heavy fighting the Army, had to withdraw after sustaining hundreds of casualties and dozens of tanks destroyed. The Tiger defenders of Puliyankulam had irrevocably delayed the Army’s advance and the operation could no longer be completed.
But this time round, the Task Force 2 under the command of Brigadier Rohana Bandara, operating along the A9 road was able to capture Puliyankulam and Kanagarayankulam, two very vital junctions. The Army had to face a lot of sacrifice to capture these two vital areas. A new checkpoint has already been established at this ‘Y’ shaped junction at Puliyankulam to check south-bound movements, mainly ICRC vehicles shuttling between LTTE-controlled and Security Forces-controlled areas.
Advantages of capturing Mankulam and NedunkerniThe capture of Mankulam will facilitate the use of the A-9 highway as the main service route. This is important in view of the existing monsoon conditions and will also enable development of operations into Oddusudan and Killinochchi. Likewise the capture of Nedunkerni will enable the development of operations into Oddusudan from the south. Along with operations from the Mankulam to the east, an effective concentration of force on to Oddusudan could be achieved.
The draw backs of the Jayasikurui Operations were mainly the following:
a. Troops conducting operations were subject to burn-out due to poor planning and lack of recruitment, resulting in low morale.
b. The main focus was on terrain and real estate and not on the LTTE. Hence, though ground was captured the LTTE strength was not reduced. However, in the current operations the Army Commander has introduced new concepts which have resulted in the maximum destruction and or reduction of the Tigers, hence causing inability to the LTTE to hold on to ground.
c. The area held during Operation Jayasikurui was inadequate, not defensible and the Forces relied on one critical line of communications. However, today a larger area with two or more lines of communications is available. 
d. The principle reason was that Operation Jayasikurui did not reduce the LTTE fighting power significantly, resulting in its ability to re-concentrate force effectively.
Bad weatherMeanwhile, due to the heavy showers experienced recently in the Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu areas, most irrigation tanks and canals are flooded and areas muddy. This has considerably slowed down the military advance but Army fire power artillery and Armor are still intact . But troops have been keeping their forward movements steady, prompting a senior officer in the frontline to comment, “If the weather had not been a barrier, our troops would have reached Kilinochchi by now and would be marching onwards to Mullaitivu.”
On Monday (Dec. 8) three senior LTTE cadres who had fought for the terrorist outfit for more than a decade surrendered to the Army. These cadres came from Alfa two base. According to Army sources, the three Tiger cadres had given themselves up to the Army’s 58 Division operating in the Pooneryn area. They have been identified as S. Sudhakaran (26 years), Casper Legus (25 years) and Baraprakash, also in his twenties. During interrogation, it has been revealed that Sudhakaran’s address is 19/V, Nagaswatte Lane, Kirulapone, Baraprakash is from Vattakachchi in Mannar and Legus is from Mullamunai in Mannar.
They have told the Army that many more LTTE cadres are waiting for an opportunity to abandon the outfit and surrender to the Security Forces as they have realised that it is futile to fight the Sri Lanka Army. They also have said that the lower rung cadre was fed up with the LTTE as the hierarchy was enjoying the benefits while the lower cadre was being sent to fight the Army.
The three surrendered Tiger cadres have given the Army a voice cut to be broadcast. The recorded message requested the remaining cadres to surrender as further fighting does not serve any purpose at all. While the Security Forces broadcast the request, it also added a warning to Prabhakaran and his cadres to either surrender or be killed.
Meanwhile, reports from Tiger controlled areas say that the Tiger chief has issued a stern warning to his cadres that if they surrender, they would be killed. So, it is a matter of surrender AND be killed or surrender OR be killed. The better option for the Tiger cadres would be to surrender, as if that happens, V. Prabhakaran will have more than his handful to be killed. And those who have already surrendered are still hale and hearty in Government controlled areas
Comfort for caged TigersMost hardcore Tiger cadres arrested are being detained at the Colombo Magazine or Kalutara Prisons. They are said to be enjoying all the perks not enjoyed by other prisoners. It is said that there are some corrupt Prison Guards who have allowed them to take in mobile phones into their prison cells. The guards are said to be paid anywhere between Rs. 6,000 to Rs. 7,000 for this and they are said to be allowing the Tiger cadres to carry on conversations to whomever they want. This is an extremely dangerous situation. Not only phones, whatever the prisoners want, whether food, liquor or other things, are all allegedly supplied by these few guards back by corrupt officers . The particular Tiger cadres just call their handlers in Colombo and instruct them to deposit the required amounts of cash into the guard’s account. Not only Prison Guards but there are officers too who are said to be involved. Surprisingly, the current Commissioner General of Prisons is Major General (Rtd) Vajira Wijegunawaredena, himself a senior Army officer.